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INTRODUCTION 
 
The practice of biobanking is of major importance to biomedical research in modern 
Western economies.  However, biobanking is troubled by a number of ethical and legal 
concerns including issues of consent, control and privacy. Recent developments in the 
networking of biobanks and the sharing of samples and data have exacerbated these issues. 
This paper outlines these problems and then examines how they can be understood through 
the law of gifts.  
 
Much of the debate on how tissue is donated to biobanks has occurred without reference to 
the law of gifts. This is most probably due to the res nullius rule, which, until recently, has 
prevented unprocessed human tissue from being considered an object of property. 1 But 
recent changes to the common law’s approach to human tissue now invite a reconsideration 
of the role that gifts law can play in tissue banking (and tissue donation more generally).2 
This paper will proceed on the assumption that tissue which has not been subject to work 
and skill may nevertheless be held as property and that the decision to donate to a tissue 
bank can be treated as an example of a legally recognised gift.  
 
The paper begins with an example of tissue banking and the legal and ethical issues which it 
raises. Most prominent amongst these difficulties is the focus on tissue banking on informed 
consent, a doctrine originally designed to deal with negligence advice and bodily 
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interferences in medical treatment and research. While understandable, the focus on 
informed consent has created a number of problems particularly in areas of unspecified 
research, unanticipated findings and privacy. 
 
The chapter then moves to reviewing the basic law of gifts by examining the elements of 
gifts in both law and equity and the requirements for conveying them.  The chapter also 
explains the law’s capacity to recognise different conditions in gifts that limit the also 
creates the possibility of conditional dispositions which allow for donors to maintain some 
rights over the tissue, with the possibility of a form of interest which would enable the 
donor to regain possession and control of their tissue if here was a breach. This paper argues 
that an application of the law of gifts is a flexible and useful way of reconceptualising the 
ethical and legal difficulties of biobanking. 
 
BIOBANKS AND BIOBANK NETWORKS 
 
What are biobanks and what do they do? 
 
Biobanks (also known as tissue banks, biorepositories or tissue repositories) are collections 
of human body materials that can be used in medical treatments (eg, blood banks, cornea 
banks) research, teaching, law enforcement (eg, DNA collections) and museums.  The body 
tissues that make up biobanks may be removed from healthy donors, from patients in the 
course of medical diagnosis or therapy, or from bodies post-mortem. 
 
By collecting and storing large numbers of tissue samples from healthy populations and/or 
patients with a particular disease, researchers are able to correlate characteristics of the 
tissue with the aetiology, prognosis or treatment responsiveness of a disease. Advances in 
science and laboratory technology such as tissue immortalisation, rapid genome sequencing, 
genome-wide association studies (GWAS), mass spectrometry and tissue microarrays, 
together with a deeper understanding of systems biology and advances in information 
technology enable researchers to extract enormous amounts of genetic or other molecular 
data from tissue samples, and to find clinically significant patterns in these data.3  
 
Biobanks facilitate ‘translational’ research because they enable researchers to identify 
‘biomarkers’ that tell them which patients are most likely to develop a disease and/or 
respond to a particular treatment. In this way, prevention and therapy can be ‘targeted’ or 
‘personalised’ to those who express a particular biomarker. Many cancer cells, for example, 
express particular genes or proteins that contribute to the aetiology, prognosis or treatment 
responsiveness of the tumour. Once these markers are discovered, pharmaceutical 
companies can develop ‘targeted’ therapies, such as ‘Herceptin’ for breast cancer and 
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‘Gleevec’ for chronic myeloid leukaemia, and those funding medicines can limit access to 
those who are most likely to respond to these (often very expensive) treatments.4  
 
The globalisation of research and the increasing involvement of the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry in research have also been provided a major impetus for the 
development and expansion of biobanks. To support the discovery of biomarkers, most 
clinical trials now include the collection and storage of tissue as part of their standard 
protocol.5 But while the biomedical and commercial value of biobanks have been widely 
recognized by industry, government and philanthrophic bodies it has also become clear that 
the storage and use of biobanked materials in research continues to stimulate numerous 
unresolved and emerging ethical and legal tensions.  
 
Emerging problems in biobanking practice 
 
Key among the problems of biobanking is the issue of consent. While it used to be the norm 
for residual tissue removed in the course of diagnosis or therapy to be used for research 
without consent,6 it is now widely accepted that donors need to be asked for permission to 
store and use their samples.7 Ethical disagreements about consent frequently centre on the 
tension between individual autonomy, or respect for persons, and the ‘common good’ – a 
tension that is seen to be particularly significant in the context of biobanking research 
because this often depends upon the participation of large numbers of people (including 
healthy populations), many of whom are unlikely to benefit from the results of the research. 
This tension is increased by the fact that pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies are 
increasingly creating their own biobanks as part of their basic research and clinical trial 
activities, with the intention of benefiting shareholders rather than tissue donors.8  In this 
context, it is arguably important to ensure that donors are fully informed of the potential 
risks and benefits of their donation.9 
 
Informed consent is a legal and ethical doctrine concerned with ensuring that medical 
practitioners inform patients about the material risks of treatment and research 
interventions. It is primarily focused on providing a patient with enough information so they 
can decide whether or not to become involved in a course of treatment or research. Given 
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that most tissue is collected during a medical or research intervention it makes sense, on 
one hand, that the same model of consent be employed to tissue banking. However, on the 
other hand, it can also be argued that informed consent is an inappropriate model to adopt 
for biobanking because donors will be asked to consent to having their tissue used in 
unspecified future research where the risks are completely unknown.10 Moreover the tissue 
is not longer part of the donor’s body so concepts of the harm and benefit of research 
necessary take on quite different forms. Given the lack of knowledge about what will 
happen to the tissue in the future consent processes must be very broad, so broad that they 
arguably bear little resemblance to an ‘informed’ consent process.11 
 
A number of other ethical issues arise in the context of biobanking research. First, because 
even a single cell contains a donor’s entire genome, steps need to be taken by researchers 
to ensure that information derived from donated tissue does not find its way into the hands 
of, for example, employers and insurance companies.12 Second, there is the issue of whether 
and how research findings should be reported to tissue donors.13 While it is standard for 
consent forms to say that donors will not benefit personally from donating their tissue to 
biobanks, it is unclear when information becomes clinical significant and thus when 
researchers have an obligation to return information to tissue donors and/or their health 
care professionals.14 Third, some cultural groups see human tissue as having particular moral 
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or religious significance. For these groups, even a tumour removed in the course of diagnosis 
or treatment might need to be stored or discarded according to particular rules or rituals.15   
 
From biobanks to biobanking networks 
 
Another recent ethical problem for biobanking relates to networking. While biobanks have 
historically been defined in terms of their institutional or geographical location, increasingly 
human specimens are becoming part of national and international networks of biobanks. 
This has been made possible by new scientific and computer technologies have increased 
our ability to categorise, organise and share samples and data, and it is now broadly 
accepted that biobanks have the greatest potential as resources for translational research if 
they are networked, nationally and internationally.16  This is simply because the larger and 
more integrated a biobank, the greater the power of the research that can be conducted. 
 
As part of a global project (www.genebanc.eu) funded by the European Commission’s 6th 
Framework Programme, Shickle and colleagues identified 6 types of non-mutually exclusive 
or exhaustive categories of biobanking networks which include: 
 ‘storage’ networks - where storage facilities are shared among biobanks to reduce 
cost and raise quality;  
 ‘bring-and-share storage’ networks - which offer lower fee structures for 
researchers to encourage sharing of resources with other researcher;  
 ‘catalogue’ networks - which maintain a database that is searchable by external 
researchers seeking samples for their research;  
 ‘partnership’ networks - which attempt to share costs and effort in recruitment;  
 ‘contribution’ networks, where people contribute relevant specimens to disease 
specific biobank(s), and  
 ‘expertise’ networks, which share expertise rather than samples. 17 
There are many types of research which can only be conducted if biobanks are networked. 
For some research questions, enormous numbers of samples are needed.  For example, in 
the case of tissue collected from healthy populations for longitudinal analyses (observing a 
population for the occurrence of a disease and attempting to isolate relevant aetiological 
biomarkers), it is estimated that DNA of about 10000 diseased individuals needs to be 
analysed in order to identify a relevant genetic variant.18  Biobank networks are also crucial 
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in the study of rare diseases, where a single researcher cannot possibly collect enough 
samples,19 and even common diseases such as cancer and heart disease are increasingly 
seen to comprise a number of rare disease subsets characterised by, for example, specific 
genetic polymorphisms.20  Networks are also essential in cases where it is socially and 
logistically difficult to obtain tissue—for example collecting post-mortem brain tissue in the 
face of a decline in the number of autopsies conducted and more stringent consent 
requirements for tissue retention.21  Pharmaceutical companies also need large networks of 
biobanks in order to meet the regulatory requirement that they study samples and data 
from populations of different ethnic origins in the course of their clinical trials.22  Finally, it 
has become increasingly clear that single biobanks, particularly those maintained by single 
institutions, are rarely sustainable and are inefficient—duplicating the resources and 
activities of other similar biobanks.23 
 
While the networking of biobanks undoubtedly holds major scientific, commercial and social 
promise networking raises similar ethical and legal concerns to the practice of individual 
biobanks. However, these issues becomes far more complex when research is globalised and 
tissues are shared across borders.24 The primary concern, as described by Hoeyer, is that: 
The move towards large-scale population-based biobanks and huge international 
collaborations might very well … cut the ties between the individual patient and the 
research community in ways that make researchers less accountable to donor 
interests. 25 
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Therefore, the key problem raised by networking is how to maintain a relationship between 
donors and wider members of the network who have had no previous relationship with the 
donor. 
 
THE LAW OF GIFTS 
 
A gift is a voluntary transfer of property where one person, the ‘donor’, transfers property to 
another person, the ‘donee’ or ‘volunteer’. A voluntary transfer is one that is not supported 
by consideration, which means that nothing of value is given in exchange for the donated 
property. Commonly, most people would associated money with being valuable 
consideration but common law and equity recognise a wide variety of behaviours which 
constitute consideration including promises (such as to perform a task, to marry or to 
forebear from suing),  labour or a reciprocal transfer of property rights.  
 
Conveying gifts 
 
The method of conveying a gift will depend on the nature of the property which is being 
donated, and whether the transaction is being done legally or equitably. Since the Statute of 
Frauds 1677 (UK), gifts of legal interests in land need to be by deed.26 A gift of an interest in 
land may also need to be registered to pass the legal title to the done, particularly in 
jurisdictions which have the Torrens system of title.27  
 
For personal property, gifts of choses in action (incorporeal personal property) must be in 
writing, and the chose must be given absolutely (which effectively precludes part ownership 
of a chose in action being gifted at law, ie it is not possible to give 50% of your right to 
royalties at law).28 Contrastingly, a gift of goods does not require writing to be effective. All 
that is required is an intention to pass ownership of the goods and delivery of the goods 
(either physically or constructively).29 
 
Property can also be donated in equity. However, equity took a negative attitude to the 
enforcement of incomplete gifts of legal property that could have been given at law, but 
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where the donor failed to comply with the legal requirements. Equity adopted the maxims 
that ‘equity does not perfect an imperfect gift’ and ‘equity would not assist a volunteer’.30 
However, there are circumstances in which equity will allow equitable title to pass to a done 
in such situations, namely, where the donor has both done everything necessary to be done 
by him/her to effect the transaction and had put the property beyond his/her recall.31 In 
such cases equity will treat the gift as having been completed and such equitable gifts grant 
the donee an equitable title which can be enforced against the donor and third parties. 
 
Equity allows gifts of property which were not assignable at law to be completed as long as 
the donor manifested a complete and irrevocable intention to give the property.32 The 
classic example of such a transaction is the trust, where the legal owner either declares that 
they hold the property for the benefit of another, or where they transfer the property to a 
trustee to hold the legal title for the benefit of another. The trust was not recognised by 
common law courts but was enforced in equity, hence the title of the beneficiaries being 
classified as an equitable interest. However, the Statute of Frauds provisions require some of 
these gifts, namely trusts of land (but not personalty) and gifts of subsisting equitable 
interests (in both land and personalty) to be in writing.33  
 
Conditional gifts 
 
Gifts can be given with or without conditions. If conditions are stipulated it is important to 
distinguish between those conditions that have to be satisfied prior to the gift taking effect 
(conditions precedent)34 and those conditions that must be satisfied after the gift has passed 
(conditions subsequent). 35 A condition precedent will be recognisable because it must 
logically be satisfied before the gift can take effect (eg, ‘I give my house to A if A reaches the 
age of 25 years’). A condition subsequent will be recognisable because the gift is given but 
able to be defeated if there is a breach (eg, ‘I give the house to A as long as he continues to 
use it as his common residence’).36  
 
In gifts subject to a condition precedent, the donor retains title to the property until the 
condition is satisfied. In gifts subject to conditions subsequent, the property passes to the 
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donee, but the donor retains a right to resume the title if there is a breach, that nature of 
which depends on whether the condition subsequent creates a determinable interest.37 
 
Conditions subsequent and determinable interests 
 
What is a determinable interest? A distinction can be drawn between an absolute gift that is 
subject to a condition subsequent and gift which grants a determinable interest that 
automatically ends on the breach of a condition. The absolute gift which is subject to a 
condition subsequent, in effect, grants a complete interest, that is then divested on the 
breach of the condition. In contrast, a determinable interest is one granted with the 
condition built into it so that the interest is itself defined by the breach of the condition. 
Such a determinable interest is viewed as naturally coming to an end when the condition is 
breached.38   
 
The differences between these two types of condition relate purely to the form and wording 
of the disposition.39 For example, a trust ‘to A for life, but if A ceases to use the property as a 
hotel, then to B’ is considered to create an interest which is subject to a condition 
subsequent.40 The life interest is granted to B, but can be artificially cut short by the event of 
B no longer using the property as a hotel. However, if the trust was worded ‘to B for life until 
B ceases to use the property as a hotel’, B’s life interest is always limited in time to the event 
of the property no longer being used as a hotel. If and when the property is no longer used 
as a hotel, B’s estate comes naturally to an end.  
 
While these semantic distinctions are unlikely to loved by anyone but property lawyers, they 
have practical effects. Firstly, in the cases of a determinable interest in land the donor 
always retains an interest in the property (a ‘possibility of reverter’ or ‘reverter’ interest) 
which continues even through the property has been given and which flowers back into full 
ownership automatically on breach. In contrast, a breach of a condition subsequent gives 
the donor a right to resume title (‘a right of re-entry’) but only if it is exercised. The donor’s 
interest is therefore notionally stronger in cases of determinable interests than in cases of 
conditions subsequent.  
 
Secondly, there are a number of other public policy rules which might strike down a 
condition.41 If the condition is part of a determinable interest it is not possible to separate 
out the condition from the gifts and the entire gift will fail, causing it to revert back to the 
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donor. If, however the gift is not subject to a conditional limitation but merely a condition 
subsequent, the condition is severable and the striking down of the condition will leave the 
gift to stand, free of the offending condition. 
 
Conditional gifts and goods 
 
So far the examples of conditional gifts given above have been ones involving gifts of land. 
Can gifts of personal property be subject to conditions which create rights similar to 
reverters or rights of re-entry? Holdsworth says that the common law never recognised that 
a donor of a conditional gift of goods retained a property interest in them (like a possibility 
of reverter).42 A gift of goods for a limited time (such as a life estate) was said to be a gift 
forever and the donee was free to do with the property as he or she pleased.  
 
However, there are exceptions to this general rule. For example, common law enforced 
conditions subsequent for gifts of goods in contemplation of marriage. Such gifts are said to 
be made on the condition that if the marriage does not proceed the goods (such as the 
engagement ring) will be returned.43 It is not clear whether the common law recognised any 
estate in the donor prior to the failure of couple to marry but, in any event, equity will 
ordinarily step in and hold the property on a resulting or constructive trust. This indicates 
that the donor, at the very least, retains an equitable interest (probably because the done is 
bound by conscience to give back the gift).44 
 
Equity also provided a number of other mechanisms for granting a proprietary interest to 
the donor in a conditional gift.  The simplest way was for the gift to take the form of a trust. 
Trusts of goods can be subject to conditions on how the beneficial interest is to be enjoyed 
(eg ‘I give the car to A on trust for B until B marries’). Once B marries the trust would end 
and the property would revert on a resulting trust back to the donor.  
 
Equity would also recognise a condition which created a personal equitable obligation on 
the part of the donee to perform some act if they have been given property. In some 
circumstances the courts will interpret a conditional disposition as imposing a personal 
equitable obligation on the donee, such as the payment of an amount of money — for 
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example, an annuity — to a third party.45 Sometimes the obligation to the third party will be 
less definite, such as an obligation to ‘support’ or ‘take care’ of a third party, or make sure 
they ‘want for nothing’.46 The donee in such gifts is subject to a personal equitable 
obligation which is enforceable but which does not create a property right in the donor or a 
third party beneficiary.47 Nor does a breach of the obligation give rise to a forfeiture of the 
gift, unless the donor takes action for specific performance of the condition.48  
 
APPLYING  GIFTS LAW TO BIOBANKING 
 
How then might gifts law be applied to donations of human tissue for biobanking? The 
starting point is to determine the proprietary nature of human tissue – is it real property, a 
chose in action or a good? Clearly, human tissue is not real property, except, possibly, in 
those rare cases where it has been buried or frozen in the ground.49 Apart from those rare 
occasions, human tissue is a physical thing which can be possessed and which is not 
attached to land. The most natural property category would therefore be goods, which in 
terms means that a gift can be made of tissue according to the general law of goods (subject 
to the requirements of applicable human tissue legislation).  
 
However, a single focus on goods may be misleading because biobanking not only includes a 
gift of the tissue but permission to derive products such as immortal cell lines and genetic 
sequences from the tissue. Donors may also give access to their health records with 
permission for those records to be used in data linkage. On that basis, it is possible to 
conceive that a tissue donor may not only be donating the tissue as a good, but also giving a 
number of related choses in action.  
 
The next step would be to determine the nature of any conditions attached to the gift. It is 
in this area that property law has a great advantage over the law of informed consent. 
Informed consent is positively permissive (eg, ‘I consent to research protocol X, which carries 
a risk of Y’). The duty of informed consent requires that the researcher provide information 
on what may happen to the tissue and the attendant risks involved, even though this is 
extremely difficult or impossible to know in tissue banking because very little or nothing is 
known about the risks of unspecified research. In contrast, the law of conditional gifts is 
negatively permissive. It focuses on the expressed and implied limits of what is permitted by 
the donor (eg ‘I donate my tissue to A so long as it is not used for human cloning’). Such 
limits have the advantage of being capable of expression when the gift is given, unlike a 
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statement by a done about material risk for research which hasn’t been invented yet. By 
focusing on what the donor does not want there is a better chance of the donee behaving in 
a way that respects the donor’s autonomy. 
 
If the participant is unconcerned about future research and does not seek to limit it, there 
needs to be very few conditions laid out in the gift. Conversely, if the donor has very specific 
concerns about the types of research the tissue will be used to perform (such as cultural or 
religious concerns) these can be set out in the donation (for eg, ‘I give my tissue to A on the 
condition that the tissue and its derivative products not be used for research involving 
embryonic stem cells’). Similarly, if the donor has concerns about being contacted if there 
are unanticipated findings these again can be set out as a condition. The flexibility of gifts 
law allows for these different concerns to be accommodated. 
 
Are there some conditions which should always be implied in a gift to a biobank? As with the 
example above of gifts in contemplation of marriage, it might be argued that there are 
conditions which should always be implied in any gift to a biobank because of the inherent 
nature of what is being given. At the very least, gifts of human tissue would arguably be 
made on the condition that the donor will be able in most cases to remove the tissue from 
biobank, or have it destroyed, should they change their mind, at least before the tissue has 
itself been consumed by the research. Another obvious condition would be that the donor’s 
health information be keep confidential to the researchers accessing the tissue bank. 
Another condition may be the requirement that any research that is conducted on the tissue 
must be approved by an human research ethics committee.50 
 
The only reported case of a court considering a conditional gift of human tissue is 
Washington University v Catalona.51 In this case a researcher recruited several thousand 
participants to provide tissue for a study into the genetics causes of prostate cancer. When 
the researcher decided to relocate to another institution he wanted to take the tissue bank 
with him. However Washington University claimed that the tissue bank had been created by 
its employee and, as such, the bank belonged to it. The participants argued that they had 
donated their tissue on the condition that it only be researched on by that particular 
researcher. Washington University disputed that saying that the tissue had been donated to 
it as an institution and not to an individual.  
 
Both at trial and on appeal it was found that the tissue had been donated to the University 
as valid and binding gifts. The court relied on both the consent form and the surrounding 
circumstances of the research project, such as the practices of the researcher (particularly 
how he would often destroy samples in his research), as further evidence that the donors 
had intended to give the university property rights equating to ownership. The court was 
prepared to find that there was an implied condition that the donors could withdraw their 
tissue from the study (and, in some cases, demand that it be destroyed). However, the court 
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refused to find that there was any condition (express or implied) which allowed the donors 
to control the identity of who performed research on the tissue. 
 
Catalona illustrates the importance of both express and implied conditions in the donation 
of human tissue. While the court was prepared to find for an implied term of a right to have 
the property removed from the research protocol, the lack of express terms relating to who 
could use the tissue was fatal to the donors claims that they could control would had access. 
This certainly puts the onus on tissue donors to be consciously aware of what limitations 
they wish to place on their donations and creates concerns about the ability of donors to do 
so (which will discussed below) 
 
A final illustration of why a conditional gift model is more useful than an informed consent 
model comes when one reflects on the biobanking network problem which was discussed 
above. In biobank networks third parties have access to tissue and may borrow or take 
tissue samples, even though they do not have direct consent to do so from the donors. In 
informed consent terms there is no duty to provide information about material risks 
because there is no relationship with the donor. Requiring the third party to seek direct 
consent from the donor is impractical and defeats the purpose of the network. However, by 
not having direct consent there is a risk that the interests of donors are further and further 
removed from the researcher’s behaviour. Sometimes regulation may try to enforce such an 
obligation, such as through requiring the research to be approved of a human research 
ethics committee. However, research ethics committees may try to impose a ‘re-consent’ 
process which (as we have said) may be impractical. Alternatively, in the Australian context, 
the committee may approve the research without consent (if the committee believes the 
research to be in the public interest) but this further divorces the donor from maintain some 
interest in the tissue.52 
 
If one adopts a conditional gift approach, these problems may be avoided because the 
donor arguably continues to have an interest in the property which should be effective 
against third parties in the network. If we adopt the position stated above that a gift of 
human tissue is a gift of goods (with some related choses in action), the conditions of the gift 
should be enforceable in common law, like gifts in contemplation of marriage. Equity would 
go on to recognise that the donors retain an equitable interest in the tissue (as it does in 
gifts in contemplation of marriage, or in personal equitable obligations) because it would be 
unconscionable for the biobank network members to take the tissue subject to conditions 
and then ignore them. If the conditions are breached equity could order specific 
performance of the obligation, equitable compensation or a constructive trust over the 
tissue to protect it against further interference. The only situation in which a third party may 
have a defence is if the third party is a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the 
conditions.53 However, in a biobank network that will be highly unlikely as the original 
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conditions of the gift will ordinarily be known, or should be known, by the third parties. As 
such they will have notice and be bound to respect the equity of the donor. Alternatively, 
third parties in networks are ordinarily volunteers themselves, receiving the tissue as a gift, 
again with the result that they are subject to the earlier equity of the donors because they 
are not purchasers for value. 
 
There remain some practical concerns. The first concern is the assumption that donors are in 
a position to bargain for conditions being imposed. Biobanks may be tempted to create 
standard agreements which will be unconditional, leaving them with the greatest amount of 
freedom and donors with no remaining interest. One way to counter balance this problem 
would be to introduce implied terms, as were discussed above. These could either be 
introduced through the common law method (as they were in gifts in contemplation of 
marriage) or through statute (as they are in socially important contracts such as leases and 
sale of land). Implied terms would create a minimum standard of behavioural expectation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The law of gifts provides a new way of considering gifts of human tissue to biobanks. It is by 
no means a panacea for all of the ethical and legal problems of biobanking. However, the 
advantage of a gift approach is that it respects the fact that donors wish to maintain some 
modicum of control over what happens to their tissue after it has been given, by recognising 
a continuing proprietary interest. The rules are flexible and allow for degrees of control. This 
gives donors some choice in how to donate their tissues and for what purposes. On the 
other hand, the rules are complicated and may not be easily understood by donors and who 
may not think to express their desires in binding ways when donating. This problem raises 
the further issue of what terms should the courts imply into gifts of tissue as having that 
provide basic protection for donors of human tissue. Thankfully, the law of gifts already has 
an arsenal of different approaches (implied terms, statutory protections) that might mitigate 
these concerns. 
